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Abstract
We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience.
Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their
apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted
from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables
conscious perceptual experience andmakes it more flexible, and thusmore adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification
provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by
global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast.
It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly
dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global
mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the
context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.
Keywords: apical amplification; perceptual consciousness; perceptual content-specific activity; unconscious content-specific
processing
Introduction
More than a decade ago, John Bickle announced the coming
era of “molecular and cellular consciousness studies” (Bickle
2007, 291). Whereas mainstream cognitive neuroscience usually
investigates consciousness at network and higher levels, cellu-
lar and molecular approaches to consciousness are concerned
with processes within individual neurons. Although this low-
level approach is not yet common in consciousness science (for
notable recent exceptions, Flohr 2000; see Sevush 2016; Laberge
and Kasevich 2007; Aru et al. 2020b), it has several strengths
to recommend it. Cellular approaches to consciousness, and to
cognition in general, build upon decades of successful neuro-
biological work and proceed by the highly effective methods of
precisemeasurements and targeted interventions into the cellular
processes.1
In this article, we aim to contribute to this nascent and excit-
ing field of study. Anesthesia (Suzuki and Larkum 2020), absence
epilepsy (Cossart et al. 2001; Kole et al. 2007), and slow-wave
sleep (Aru et al. 2020a) all prevent apical input to neocortical
cells amplifying their output, so we consider the possibility that
conscious experience when awake depends on apical amplifi-
cation (AA). The theory of conscious perception presented here
1 We do not assume, with Bickle, that explanation of conscious perception
can be completely reduced to the cellular level. We return to this point below
in the “Relations of the AA theory to the dominant network-level accounts of
perceptual consciousness” section.
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aims to explain how mechanisms within a particular class of
pyramidal neurons, i.e. context-sensitive cells in layer 5B of the
neocortex, provide cellular foundations for network-level pro-
cesses that have long been thought to be neuronal correlates
of perceptual experience. We start with a short overview of the
mechanisms and then guide the reader through four distinctive
features of the theory. The ways in which this article comple-
ments and advances beyond previous articles on the perspec-
tive that we advocate are listed in the “Concluding remarks”
section.
The mechanism of AA
Cortical processing revolves around pyramidal neurons. Of special
interest are context-sensitive cells with two points of integration
as exemplified by a subset of layer 5B pyramidal neurons.2 These
cells have two distinct zones of integration—the somatic integra-
tion zone and the apical integration zone, as shown in Fig. 1.
Both zones initiate active regenerative voltage-dependent trans-
missions. For instance, the apical integration zone initiates cal-
cium spikes and the somatic integration zone sodium action
potentials.
The somatic integration zone of a layer 5B (L5B) pyramidal
neuron receives inputs from basal dendrites that feed directly into
the cell body. These inputs to the somatic integration zone oper-
ate as a chain of feedforward inputs from sensors such as the
retina, viamodality-specific first-order thalamic relay nuclei, such
as the LGN, to primary sensory cortices, and then onward through
hierarchies that extract progressively more abstract features from
the information provided by the sensory input. The feedforward
stimuli reaching the somatic integration zone in visual pyrami-
dal neurons contain information about color, shape, contours,
motion, surface, position in space, size, depth, and so on.
The long apical trunk of a pyramidal neuron can be divided
into proximal, intermediate, and distal (tuft) segments. The api-
cal integration zone resides in the distal upper part of the trunk
oriented toward the surface of the cortex, in cortical layer 1. The
elongated dendritic trunk allows for the coupling of the activity of
its somatic zone (close to the neuron soma in the deeper cortical
layer) and apical zone (in the upper cortical layer). With this kind
of structural setup, the L5 pyramidal neuron enables the interac-
tion between diverse contextual inputs to the apical dendrites in
layer 1 and content-specific input to the somatic integration zone
(Larkum et al. 2001).
The apical integration zone receives diverse feedback inputs
from higher perceptual regions and from intralaminar and other
“nonspecific” thalamic nuclei, top-down inputs from prefrontal
cortical regions, and inputs from nuclei in the amygdala, from
parahippocampal regions, and from neuromodulatory systems
(Rockland and Pandya 1979; Cauller 1995; Diamond 1995; Rhodes
and Llinás 2001; Larkum et al. 2004, 2009; Larkum 2013, Figure
I in Box 1 at 143; Ramaswamy and Markram 2015; Stuart and
Spruston 2015). The activity in the apical integration zone differs
from that in the somatic integration zone in one crucial respect:
its role in perception is to act as a modulator of the strength with
which information abstracted from feedforward activity is trans-
mitted. If the net input to the apical integration zone exceeds the
calcium spike initiation threshold and the soma receives feedfor-
ward evidence for the perceptual features to which it is selectively
sensitive, then those features are signaled to downstream sites
2 It is assumed that other pyramidal neurons are also included in this class,
such as some cells in layer 2/3, but the full extent of this class is not yet known.
Figure 1. A schematic depiction of the two integration zones of a mature
L5 pyramidal neuron. For simplicity, the local microcircuitry has been
reduced to just those inhibitory connections that are of paramount
significance for the view that apical and basal dendrites are functionally
distinct. The apical dendritic tree is also referred to as the “tuft.” VIP,
SOM, and PV are three anatomically, neurochemically, and
physiologically distinct classes of inhibitory interneurons. Other classes
are not shown here. In perceptual regions, PV cells are activated by
feedforward sensory data and suppress depolarization of the soma by
the basal dendrites. SOM cells receive inputs from within the same
region and provide a tonic, i.e. sustained, blanket of inhibition of the
apical dendrites, from which a few selected cells are released by the
disinhibiting effects of VIP inhibitory interneurons (Karnani et al. 2014).
Although not shown here to keep the diagram simple, all these
inhibitory interneurons receive excitatory input from the pyramidal cells
that they inhibit, thus producing oscillations at various frequencies. PFC:
prefrontal cortex; FF: feedforward sensory input to the basal dendrites;
FB: feedback from higher perceptual regions; Lateral: lateral interactions
within the same region; HOT: “higher-order” thalamus; Amyg: amygdala;
VIP, SOM, and PV: types of inhibitory interneurons
more effectively. This modulation leading to more effective trans-
mission of perceptual information coded in feedforward activity
is called AA.3
Direct intracellular recordings show that excitatory apical
input that cannot by itself generate action potential output can,
nevertheless, greatly affect the cell’s response to the feedforward
3 See, e.g., Larkum et al. (1999), Ledergerber and Larkum (2010), and Larkum
(2013). For an introduction to AA and its various implications in cognition, see
Phillips (2017). Phillips et al. (2016) review the relevance of AA to global states
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inputs to its basal dendrites and soma (Larkum 2013; Major et al.
2013); these inputs specify the receptive field features to which the
cell is selectively sensitive. When the net apical input is excitatory,
the cell’s response to its preferred sensory feature is amplified.
However, when the net input is inhibitory, due to specialized
inhibitory interneurons targeting layer 1 apical tufts (Fig. 1; SOM
inhibitory interneurons), that response is attenuated. When these
inhibitory interneurons are themselves inhibited by VIP inhibitory
interneurons, then amplification is disinhibited. This amplifying
or attenuating mode of apical function is typical of normal awake
perception.
If the apical integration zone receives a backpropagated spike
from the soma when it is also receiving excitation from tuft
dendrites in layer 1, its threshold for initiating calcium spikes
is significantly reduced. These calcium spikes, or plateaus, are
actively transported to the soma via the apical trunk where they
amplify response to the feedforward input by converting a single
somatic action potential into a brief burst of two to four action
potentials within about 20ms. This process of backpropagation-
activated calciumfiring, although themost studied, is not the only
intracellular process bywhich AAmay occur (for a detailed review,
see Section 2.3 of Phillips 2017).
Inputs to the apical integration zone specify a broad context
within which the processing of feature-specific information by
the somatic zone occurs. They impart relevant updates about
bodily needs, emotional states, current tasks, learned cogni-
tive expectations, and biases, as well as information from other
streams of sensory processing, both within and between modal-
ities. For what follows, it is important to note that inputs from
all the various sources are summed at the apical integration
zone to compute a single value, i.e. a postsynaptic potential at
the apical integration zone. This value can in no way convey
information about each of the many individual components that
it sums. The information conveyed by that single value is the
net bias toward either depolarizing (excitation) or hyperpolariz-
ing (inhibition) the apical integration zone given all these diverse
inputs.
In contrast to the role of AA in perception, cells in perceptual
regions can also be activated during imagery experiences, halluci-
nations, and dreams. We assume that in these cases inputs from
internal sources to the apical dendrites in layer 1 do generate an
action potential output, a process referred to as “apical drive” (Aru
et al. 2020a). As outputs from these cells are normally a response
to sensory input, it is to be expected that imagery, hallucinations,
and dreams will generate experiences that havemuch in common
with veridical conscious perception.
AA and perceptual consciousness
The theory briefly reviewed in the previous section has the poten-
tial to explain four phenomena distinctive of conscious percep-
tion. In particular, the cellular mechanisms describedmay help to
explain (i) how the cortically received sensory signals are amplified
such that they become part of conscious experience, (ii) how the
apical mechanism amplifies the perceptual information transmit-
ted without corrupting it, (iii) how the local signals to be amplified
are selected in the context of the organism’s current needs, goals,
and emotions, as well as of the information extracted from other
sensory inputs, and (iv) how the neuromodulatory mechanisms
underlying the global states of consciousness and the mecha-
nisms of selective conscious perception are intertwined at the
cellular andmolecular level. In this section, wewill elaborate each
of these points in more detail.
A cellular conscious-status awarding mechanism
operates upon unconsciously computed
perceptual contents
Perceptual contents are processed in dedicated sensory-
perceptual areas of the cortex. Auditory contents are processed
in primary and secondary auditory regions, perceptions of motion
in the V5/MT area, areas tuned for face stimuli are found in occipi-
tal and temporal cortical areas (Chang and Tsao 2017; Nestor et al.
2020), and so forth. Stimulus-specific activity can be generated in
these regions unconsciously, however. This activity may process
perceptual inputs from the low-level features such as orientation
or contrast up to higher levels involving object identities and
categories or wordmeanings (Greenwald et al. 1996; Kinoshita and
Lupker 2003; Boyer et al. 2005; Dehaene et al. 2006; Van Gaal and
Lamme 2012; Stein et al. 2014; Francken et al. 2015; Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren 2016; Song and Yao 2016; Hutchinson 2019; Koivisto
and Neuvonen 2020; Lucero et al. 2020). Evidence indicating that
contents of conscious experience can be processed unconsciously
and preconsciously is rich and multifaceted.4 This evidence has
been gathered with a variety of experimental paradigms (briefly
reviewed in the Appendix).
Two empirical findings are crucial for our argument. First, stim-
uli of which we are not conscious engage (parts of) the same
sensory areas as consciously experienced stimuli (Moutoussis and
Zeki 2002; Van Vugt et al. 2018; Pojoga et al. 2020; Frith 2021). That
is to say, a stimulus may activate a neural response in the appro-
priate part of a sensory cortex without eliciting its experience.
Second, the unconscious activations are differently expressed;
typically, the neural response to the same type of stimulus in
the unconscious perceptual condition (as measured by func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG), and other instruments) is “weaker” (Moutoussis and
Zeki 2002; Van Vugt et al. 2018; Fontan et al. 2021; Stein et al. 2021).
Crucially, this difference in robustness of neural response to a
stimulus does not require a corresponding change in the phys-
ical attributes of the stimulus (e.g. in its contrast or intensity).
This is clearly demonstrated in binocular rivalry experiments
(Blake 2001; Hesse and Tsao 2020) in which a physically unchang-
ing stimulus alternates between being consciously visible and
invisible.
We interpret these findings in the following way. For con-
scious perception to happen, additional processing to that which
has been sufficient for unconscious processing of the stimulus is
needed. As the main difference between preconscious and con-
scious perceptual contents consists in the strength of the neural
response in the same sensory areas, this additional processing
has to be in its nature amplificatory. The neural processes ini-
tiating the transitions of preconscious contents into perceptual
experience therefore need to possess the required amplificatory
capabilities.
We propose that it is the targeted amplification of relevant
sensory signals what helps to turn them into experienced con-
tents. The apical theory introduced in the “The mechanism of
AA” section provides a neurobiologically realistic mechanism for
this targeted amplification. Implicit perceptual contents consti-
tuted in the activity in somatic integration zones of pyramidal
neurons in L5B and elsewhere remain unconscious unless ampli-
fied by the processes of AA. We may call this cellular mechanism
a “conscious-status awarding” mechanism (CSAM; Bachmann
4 “Unconscious” means that the contents remain nonexperienced, and
“preconscious” means that contents that were initially unconscious become
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2011).5 That the recorded signals in the sensory sites in uncon-
scious perceptual conditions are weaker than in the conscious
conditions can then be explained with the help of this notion.
Our hypothesis, consistent with experimental evidence to be pre-
sented below, is that the weaker neural response in unconscious
conditions can be explained by the absence of CSAM activation
(i.e. by the absence of AA), or by its insufficient involvement. We
assume that for any content to become conscious content there
must be at least some minimal (critical, threshold) levels of AA
applied onto neural units representing that content.
The apical consciousness-awarding mechanism is not a
content-specific mechanism. In normal perception, the apical
input by itself does not specify the feature or object information
transmitted via inputs to the basal6 and perisomatic synapses.
Because AA does not specify perceptual contents, it is not con-
fined to any particular sensorymodality such as vision or audition.
As the presumed cellular CSAM, AA is a general mechanism
to be found in the cortical areas where perceptual content is
represented.7
On the hypothesis that we advocate in this article, implicit,
preamplified perceptual contents in the somatic integration zone
may retain many of their qualitative attributes such as, e.g. basic
features (e.g. orientation, size, contrast polarity, and color cat-
egory), shape category, basic phonemes, and so on. However,
although AA itself is a content-nonspecific process, implicit con-
tents specified in the basal zone may undergo some forms of
qualitative transformations due to amplification leading to con-
scious perception. In particular, without changing the featural
or object-category attributes of the stimulus, apical effects may
enhance representational salience of visual perceptual features
such as subjective contrast and brightness or subjective loudness
of an auditory percept. The research literature showing context-
dependent variation of subjective saliency or clarity of physically
invariant stimuli is rich, encompassing different sensory modal-
ities (Bachmann 1988; Knobel and Sanchez 2009; Liao et al. 2016;
Gelbard-Sagiv et al. 2018; Itthipuripat et al. 2019; Carrasco and
Barbot 2019; Eklund et al. 2020). Importantly, a change in sub-
jective representational salience of features such as subjective
contrast or brightness is just a by-product of “internal,” contex-
tually driven amplificatory processes in the pyramidal cells. Such
an enhancement does not strictly require a corresponding change
in the external stimulus, in contrast to theories of perceptual
consciousness such as Zeki and Bartels (1999).8
As a hypothesized cellular part of the CSAM, AA is distributed
in modality-specific sensory cortices and other cortical areas.9
5 In Marvan and Polák (2020) essentially the same notion is labeled “general
neural correlate of (perceptual) consciousness”. Here we speak directly of the
causally involved neurobiological mechanism itself (the neurobiological CSAM)
and focus only on the cellular level of brain description.
6 We use “basal” and “somatic” interchangeably.
7 Generality over perceptual modalities is sought as a first step to full gen-
erality over all phenomenal contents, including the extension to emotions,
thought, metacognition, dreams, working-memory contents, and so on. How-
ever, for reasons of space and because putative content representations of the
higher-order cortical areas are much less known than the sensory-perceptual
representations, we restrict our attention in this article to perceptual contents.
8 Here we will not delve into the otherwise important conceptual specifica-
tions of what precisely can be enlisted as qualitative attributes and what can-
not. Suffice it to say that some of the stimulus (object) attributes specifying the
contents may correspond to modality-specific features such as color, motion
direction, shape, loudness, or somatosensory pressure, while other attributes
are panmodal, such as intensity, clarity, distinctness, or pleasurableness. AA
can work both as the mechanism supporting selection for consciousness of
certain modally specified types of contents and as the mechanism for ampli-
fying the saliency, including saliency as measured in terms of the panmodal
attributes.
9 This does not imply that AA occurs in every part of the neocortex: there is
physiological evidence that AA may occur only when the apical dendrite trunk
This is in no way a disadvantage of the present account. The cel-
lular CSAM need not exclusively converge on a single common
neuron or a local processor of any kind or a single neural struc-
ture. All that matters is that “the same type” of cellular process
is deployed in different sensory modalities and in distinct areas
within modal sensory sites.
It is possible to envisage the employment of this common cel-
lular process as a successive set of cycles of AA, gradually leading
to a stable conscious percept. The reverse hierarchy ideas (e.g.
Hochstein and Ahissar 2002; Campana et al. 2016) may be rele-
vant here. Coarse, gist-related representations are activated by
AA for conscious experience first, and then top-down AA-based
activations directed at increasingly concrete, specific represen-
tations are adding fine features to the gist. Given the speed of
feedforward and top-down signaling volleys contrasted with how
long it takes for a subjective percept to become formed (about
200ms), there is time for such multiple cycles (with bit-by-bit
corrections between each cycle).
Although there is much physiological evidence for apical pro-
cesses in the mammalian brain, obtaining direct experimental
evidence implicating AA in conscious perception is extremely
challenging. To obtain such evidence, it is necessary to record
the specific transactions between distinct parts of a single neuron
and correlate them with a concurrent behavior of a living ani-
mal. Encouragingly, this correlation was established in a recent
study on whisker stimuli detection in mice (Takahashi et al.
2016). The authors performed a two-photon imaging study of api-
cal Ca2+ activity in L5 pyramidal neurons during a perceptual
task. The animals were trained to signal the detection of small
whisker deflections by licking to obtain water rewards. The exper-
imental results indicate that the ability of the animal to detect
whisker deflections is closely correlated with increased levels of
calcium currents in the apical dendrites of L5 pyramidal cells
in the primary somatosensory cortex. Inversely, the absence of
reported detection correlated with a decrease in apical calcium
currents. To the extent that overt discriminative behavior of an
animal depends on conscious perception, the positive correlation
between AA in relevant parts of the somatosensory cortex and
successful behavioral detection implies that AA contributes to
perceptual consciousness. In the near future, more data of this
sort could be obtained with ultra high-resolution fMRI (Larkum
et al. 2018), which can resolve neuronal activity across cortical
layers and differentiate somatic from apical contributions within
individual cells.
Furthermore, Takahashi et al. (2016) successfully applied the
injunction to causally intervene into the hypothesized cellu-
lar mechanism and track observable behavioral effects (Bickle
2006). Their pharmacological and optogenetic interventions indi-
cate that the detection threshold can be raised or lowered by
enhancing or opposing active currents in the apical dendrites,
thus demonstrating the causal role of such currents in conscious
detection.10 Another intervention-based paradigm suitable for
studying relations between perceptual awareness and AA is tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation. Murphy et al. (2016) demonstrated
that a single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation on dendritic
activity in layer 5 pyramidal neurons of the somatosensory cortex
is at least about half amillimeter long (Fletcher andWilliams 2019). This is only
a minor restriction on the anatomical generality of AA, though, because nearly
all parts of the neocortex have pyramidal cells with trunks of that length or
more, particularly in humans.
10 See also the follow-up study (Takahashi et al. 2020) where it is demon-
strated that when themouse’s task was simply to detect a weak whisker twitch,
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inhibited dendritic Ca2+ activity. The specificity of such targeted
interventions is promising. Recently, it has been convincingly
argued that during general anesthesia, apical and somatic zones
of pyramidal neurons are decoupled, which prevents the effects
of AA (Suzuki and Larkum 2020). As a consequence, feedfor-
ward sensory processing continues to some extent during general
anesthesia but cannot be brought to the level required for per-
ceptual consciousness. A disadvantage of general anesthesia is
that it abolishes all perceptual experience. Studies using tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation could noninvasively uncover local,
fine-grained ways in which apical dendrite activity in sensory
regions contributes to conscious perception.11
AA distinguishes modulation from the
specification of the informational content
The cellular CSAMmust be capable of amplifying selected sensory
signals without corrupting their informational content. Feedback
from higher regions is a notable source of modulatory input, but
the information fed back does not become part of the sensory
input to which the cell is tuned. If information from the recur-
rent apical inputs was merged with the cells’ somatic inputs,
the message that the cell initially “broadcasts” would be lost or
distorted. In L5 pyramidal neurons, this amplification without
merging is achieved by the functional specialization of the two
distinct integration zones.
The view of pyramidal neurons as two-point processors is in
contrast with the standard view of a one-point neuron. The cen-
tral tenet of the system-level neuroscience has long been that,
for neurons in general, all positive and negative inputs to the
soma are summed, and an action potential is triggered if that sum
exceeds a threshold. However, pyramidal cells with two points of
integration operate in a fundamentally different way. They use
a summed input to the tuft dendrites to amplify response to the
somatic and perisomatic inputs. In this amplifying mode of func-
tion, the cell’s action potentials transmit information specifically
about the somatic/perisomatic sum but not about the apical sum.
Using recent advances in the foundations of information the-
ory, amplification has been formally defined as the use of one
subset of inputs to modulate the transmission of information
about other inputs without transmitting any information specif-
ically about itself (Kay and Phillips 2020). The two-point neuron
view thus allows a clear distinction between modulatory amplifi-
cation andmerging (or “combining”) information from the somatic
and apical inputs.12
In contrast to the Dendritic Integration Theory (Bachmann et al.
2020; Aru et al. 2020b), the hypothesis presented in this article does
not require that the cellular processes comprising AA achieve a
“representational match” in the content of both integration zones.
This would be difficult to achieve, because the modulating apical
inputs from higher regions bring a different sort of information
than the feature-specific cells in the sensory regions—remember
that, e.g. the amygdala is included in the diverse sources that pro-
vide inputs to the apical dendrites in layer 1. Furthermore, in order
for the representational match between the two integration zones
11 These intervention-based paradigms could be supplemented with studies
on the effects of pharmacological manipulations of arousal levels. Both percep-
tual detection and apical function are highly dependent on neuromodulatory
arousal (e.g. Phillips et al. 2016, 2018). Further light could therefore be cast on
these issues by extending pharmacological paradigms such as that of Gelbard-
Sagiv et al. (2018), in which induced changes of arousal levels are related to
perceptual detection and evoked cortical activity.
12 This feature of two-point neurons determines their role in theories of con-
sciousness based on the notions of recurrence and broadcasting; we return to
this point in the “Relations of the AA theory to the dominant network-level
accounts of perceptual consciousness” section.
to occur, the cells in lower regions would have to inherit the large
receptive fields of cells in the higher regions providing the apical
feedback inputs. This, however, does not happen. All that matters
for AA is whether the net excitatory input to the apical integra-
tion zone is positive when the net somatic or perisomatic input is
positive. It would thus be misleading to describe the apical inputs
as “matching” the somatic inputs in any sense other than in the
statistics of their co-occurrence.
Context-sensitivity and selectivity of AA
AA is not a mechanism blind to the current context of the organ-
ism’s percepts, needs, threats, or emotional state. On the contrary,
AA enables rapid, effective, and energetically low-cost context-
sensitive selection of information. The aim of contextual guidance
in perceptual processing is to amplify transmission of informa-
tion that is coherent, relevant, and informative, while attenuating
transmission of other information. Apical dendrites are in this
sense selective and context-sensitive. This selectivity and context-
sensitivity ismade possible by the diversity of the sources of apical
input. As has been remarked, these inputs arrive not just from var-
ious cortical sites but also from “nonspecific” thalamic nuclei and
from the amygdala. The fluctuating levels of arousal add further
forms of context-sensitivity, which either increase or decrease the
probability of perceptual experience and either expand or narrow
its focus. AA thus combines holistic aspects of processing with
local specificity at the level of individual cells.
It may be thought that some forms of perception require no
context. However, on closer inspection, this assumption is prob-
lematic. Perception always occurs in the context of other stimuli,
particular states of mind, and usually also in the context of par-
ticular goals. This implies that there is always the possibility that
perception could be modulated at the cellular level by any aspect
of that rich context. This concerns also the highly artificial and
seemingly contextless types of perception, such as those present
in binocular rivalry conditions. To be presented with two mutu-
ally inconsistent images, each to a different eye, already provides
a very specific context of stimulation: two perceptual interpreta-
tions of what is seen are possible. In this case, two competing
candidate percepts at the preconscious level resolve their com-
petition by means of inhibitory interneurons. These interneurons
are influenced by stochastic alternation of relative strengths of
inhibitory presynaptic effects on layer 5 neurons representing
the competing objects (e.g. in V1 or in the temporal cortex; see
Theodoni et al. 2011; Mentch et al. 2019). As shown in Fig. 1, api-
cal dendrites receive inhibitory inputs, e.g. via SOM-expressing
interneurons, fromwhich a dynamically selected few are released
by the disinhibitory effects of VIP-expressing inhibitory interneu-
rons. The evidence that is now available concerning the effects of
these inhibitory/disinhibitory dynamics provides strong support
for our conception of a functionally distinct apical zone (Schuman
et al. 2021). We can assume that in the case of binocular rivalry
those dynamics ensure that at any moment only one of the alter-
native percepts is selected for amplification and consequently
becomes part of conscious experience.
The notion of perception in the absence of any context is
also helpful when viewed from a different perspective. Suppose
one asks, not what happens when no context is present, but
what happens when contextual input received via the apical den-
drites is prevented from affecting the cell’s generation of action
potentials. As noted in the “A cellular conscious-status awarding
mechanism operates upon unconsciously computed perceptual
contents” section, this is what is thought to happen during general
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decoupled, which prevents the effects of AA (Suzuki and Larkum
2020). The outcome is the complete loss of conscious experience.
The same seems to be true for slow-wave sleep (see, e.g. Phillips
et al. 2018; Aru et al. 2020a).
A striking example of contextual modulation at lower levels of
perceptual hierarchies is provided by anatomical and physiologi-
cal studies of the interactions between primary sensory regions.
The primary sensory regions mutually interact via synaptic con-
nections in layer 1 of neocortex (Ibrahim et al. 2016; Deneux et al.
2019, as shown in Fig. 2). These interactions, which we take to be
an example of context-sensitive AA, use information from other
modalities to amplify transmission of modality-specific informa-
tion. For instance, such interactions can increase the detectability
of a near threshold visual event if it occurs at the same time as
an auditory event. The sound-induced flash illusion (Shams et al.
2000) is another example of this phenomenon. In sound-induced
flash illusion, a single visual flash accompanied by two auditory
tones is erroneously perceived as two flashes or two visual flashes
accompanied by a single auditory tone are erroneously perceived
as one flash. Analogous interactions occur between all combi-
nations of primary visual, auditory, and somatosensory cortices
(Meijer et al. 2019).13 Crucially, in line with what has been said
in the “Apical amplification distinguishes modulation from the
specification of informational content” section, these cross-modal
interactions between primary sensory regions do not corrupt the
unimodal information transmission that they modulate.
However, where they have been thoroughly studied, the effects
of contextual modulation have been found to be a mixture of
amplification and suppression that depends on many different
variables in complex ways. Amplification via apical dendrites is
strictly restrained by inhibitory interneurons that have evolved
specifically for that purpose. Amplification needs to be restrained
because, as apical dendrites are key links in positive feedback
loops, there is the ever-present danger of over-amplification (as
shown all too clearly by various pathologies; see, e.g. Phillips
and Silverstein 2003; Phillips et al. 2015). Indeed, physiological
evidence suggests that more interactions between primary sen-
sory regions may be suppressed than amplified.14 In order for
apical activation to have its amplificatory effects, specialized dis-
inhibitory interneurons must be activated in just those pyrami-
dal cells whose outputs are particularly relevant in the current
context.
As noted, the contextual cellular processes we describe are
not limited to intracortical interactions. Amplification requires
the apical integration zone to be coupled to the soma, and this
coupling in turn partly depends upon interactions between the
neocortex and the higher-order thalamus.15 Specific regions of the
higher-order thalamus (such as the pulvinar, posterior nucleus,
13 Further developments of this cross-modal paradigm are planned. They
will focus on interactions between vision and somesthesis and will study the
effects of cross-modal interactions on perceptual detection at behavioral and
cellular levels in both rodents and primates (source: Johan F. Storm, private
communication).
14 Widespread suppression of many cellular activities greatly increases the
signal-to-noise ratio of the few that are amplified. For example, Iurilli et al.
(2012) show that auditory information suppresses the transmission of poten-
tially distracting visual information by V1, via the activation of specific local
inhibitory circuits.
15 Whereas first-order thalamic nuclei relay sensory information from
receptors to the cortex, higher-order thalamic nuclei predominantly medi-
ate information transmission between cortical areas. The distinction between
the first- and higher-order thalamus roughly corresponds to the distinction
between “core” and “matrix” cells (Bickford 2016). Higher-order matrix cells are
especially important for our argument because, in addition to reciprocal con-
nections to layer 5, they predominantly target layer 1 of neocortex. For further
details on the anatomy and physiology of higher-order thalamus, see Guillery
(1995), Sherman and Guillery (2006), and (Saalmann 2014).
Figure 2. Contextual interactions between unimodal sensory regions.
Direct evidence for both contextual modulation and its dependence on
apical dendrites in layer 1 of the neocortex is provided by cross-modal
interactions between primary sensory regions that transmit unimodal
information. V1 and V2, in dark yellow, are unimodal visual regions. A1
and A2, in turquoise, are unimodal auditory regions. V/A, in pink, is a
multimodal region that combines visual and auditory cues to compute
supramodal abstractions. V1 and A1 transmit unimodal information to
the secondary unimodal regions but are modulated by cross-modal
interactions. Driving inputs from which information is extracted for
feedforward transmission are shown as solid lines. Modulatory
interactions are shown as dotted lines. The cross-modal modulatory
interactions do not corrupt the unimodal information transmission that
they modulate. LGN: lateral geniculate nucleus; MGN: medial geniculate
nucleus
and the intralaminar nuclei) send signals to both the apical trunk
and the apical tufts, while it receives descending information from
higher cortical regions and ascending information traveling from
the receptors via collaterals bypassing specific relays. When these
ascending and descending inputs are both excitatory, nuclei in the
higher-order thalamus enhance informational selectivity by send-
ing excitatory signals to the apical dendrites of pyramidal cells or
to inhibitory or disinhibitory interneurons in sensory regions of
the neocortex. This further enhances the signal-to-noise ratio by
amplifying the response of cells that track currently relevant fea-
tures, while attenuating the outputs of those that detect currently
irrelevant features (Rubio-Garrido et al. 2009; Groh et al. 2014;
Roth et al. 2016).16 At a more general level, ongoing thalamocor-
tical interactions mediated by the “nonspecific” thalamic nuclei,
16 As some psychotic disorders of perceptual experience, such as
schizophrenia, involve N-methyl-d-aspartate hypofunction (Phillips and
Silverstein 2003), it is worth noting that contextualization via apical receptors
during normal perception is highly dependent on N-methyl-d-aspartate recep-
tors. Detailed reviews of these issues are provided by Larkum (2013), Major et al.
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in particular, the intralaminar nuclei, are a prerequisite for suffi-
cient arousal, allowing context-dependent cortical activity to take
place at the level accompanied by subjective awareness (Jones
2012). These thalamocortical interactions can be suppressed, e.g.
by experimentally disabling the central medial nucleus of the tha-
lamus, thus preventing it from having its typical cortical arousal
effect (Timic Stamenic et al. 2019). A new comprehensive review
of these issues by Shepherd and Yamawaki (2021) provides com-
pelling evidence that diverse aspects of conscious perception arise
from recurrent cortico-thalamic interactions in which the apical
dendrites of layer 5 pyramidal neurons play a leading role.
Many inputs to layer 1, where the apical tufts of pyramidal
neurons in layers 2, 3, and 5 are located, come from sources
in other brain regions. Only about 10% of inputs reaching the
apical zone come from nearby neurons (Binzegger et al. 2004).
AA-centered theory therefore claims that while some feedback
to the apical zone will be more local (lateral), other forms of
feedback will be more long distance. This creates a time frame
required by the latencies of the so-called postdictive perceptual
phenomena. On some accounts, unconscious perceptual infor-
mation is maintained and can be manipulated by masking up to
450ms from the stimulus onset (Drissi-Daoudi et al. 2019). The
present theory is able to accommodate such processing delays.
It all depends on from where the signals to the apical tufts are
arriving, including how many synaptic links there are between
the neural source and neural target. Feedback from more remote
areas such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), frontal
eye fields (FEF), or ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) takes
time; this holds also for pathways originating from subcortical
structures in the brain stem, including the intralaminar thala-
mic nuclei or locus coeruleus, and projecting to rostral parts of
the cortex (from where the top-down signals are sent to caudal
sensory-perceptual areas). All these implies that the time differ-
ences with which different kinds of percepts become conscious
may depend on the localization of a source sending information
to the apical inputs.
It is important, however, to bear in mind that the major part
of firing responses to afferent input from receptors, which arrives
at the sensory content–representing parts of L5 pyramidal neu-
rons, have the poststimulus delay equal to 50–100ms or less
(Brazier 1977; Lamme and Roelfsema 2000; Takahashi et al. 2016).
On the other hand, higher-level cognitive and nonspecific phasic
arousal effects caused by stimulus presentation and setting the
context for the stimulus take longer delays to manifest (around
100–250ms) (Brazier 1977; Lamme and Roelfsema 2000; Gazzaniga
et al. 2014). Thus, in order to observe more robust contextual
effects on consciously perceived contents, the information setting
the context has to be preset before the stimulus by some time.
Because of this, the AA-centered account is also well-positioned
to explain backward masking, subjective contrast enhancement
in spatial precueing of target perception, the flash-lag effect, and
similar phenomena exploiting the time shifts between somatic
and apical inputs (Bachmann 2015). The preceding stimulus sets
the spatial context, with the top-down or phasic arousal effect
taking about 100–250ms to reach cortical neurons. The feedfor-
ward information about the following stimulus reaches the cortex
within 80ms (±20 ms). For the temporal coincidence of context-
controlled apical and target-controlled somatic signals arriving at
the same layer 5 pyramidal neuron, the context-setting first stim-
ulus has to precede the second stimulus by about 70 (±20) ms. In
the case of backward masking the optimal temporal coincidence
of the apical input and somatic input therefore takes place not for
the preceding stimulus content, but for the succeeding (masking)
stimulus content. As a result, AA optimizes the backward mask
content for conscious perception, not the first presented stimulus
content.
In the case of endogenous “attentional” spatial precueing, the
pre-cue plays a similar role to the first presented stimulus in
backward masking. However, as the spatial arrangement of the
pre-cue and target help avoid masking (the stimuli are neighbor-
ing, not overlapping), and because now the target is not the first
presented, but the following stimulus, instead of masking we get
target facilitation. The pre-cue sets the apically directed spatial-
contextual modulation in motion ahead in time and as soon as
the specific input of the target arrives at L5 pyramidal neuron, the
target is perceived.17 Similarly, target’s subjective contrast will be
enhanced as the AA of the target-encoding cells would coincide in
time with the strongest somatic input to these cells. In the flash-
lag effect (where the time constants may be somewhat different),
the preceding signals from the earlier time epochs of the presenta-
tion of the continuously changing input preset the apical process
and as soon as the input from the following signals of the contin-
uously changing input arrive at the soma of a pyramidal neuron,
the respective content appears in conscious perception. However,
if a stimulus is not preceded by streamed signals, such as when
it is presented as an unchanging separately flashed object, api-
cal modulation is not preset in time for this stimulus and it takes
longer for the flashed stimulus to reach consciousness.18
Most of the evidence on contextual modulation at the cellu-
lar level has come from single-unit studies of species other than
humans. Relevant evidence can also be provided by human neu-
roimaging, however. Although the use of neuroimaging to study
these issues is in its infancy, there have already been encourag-
ing discoveries. For example, studies using layer-specific, high-
resolution fMRI show that visual information about an occluded
part of the object or scene, inferred from the visible surround,
peaks of the object or scene peaks in the superficial cortical layers
(Muckli et al. 2015; Larkum et al. 2018). This result is to be expected
if we assume that information about the visible surround is trans-
mitted as a contextual information to apical synapses in the
superficial layers. As fMRI signals predominantly reflect synaptic
activity rather than action potentials and reflect inhibitory as well
as excitatory synaptic currents, this further supports our claim
that a major role for apical dendrites in layer 1 is to mediate
modulatory and other effects of the current context.
AA as a bridge between global states of
consciousness and conscious perceptual contents
In consciousness studies, conscious perceptual contents are tra-
ditionally distinguished from the global states of consciousness,
such as the mutually exclusive states of wakefulness, dreamless
sleep, coma, minimal consciousness, dreams, or general anesthe-
sia (Massimini et al. 2005; Owen et al. 2009; Hohwy 2009; Windt
and Noreika 2011; Meyer 2015; Bayne et al. 2016; Fazekas and
Overgaard 2016; Bayne and Carter 2018). While experienced con-
tents are in constant flux, global states of consciousness change
far less rapidly (although undergoing internal variations such as
the various levels of arousal during wakefulness). It has therefore
become common to treat the global states as mere background
17 Subliminal spatial-attentional precueing facilitation effects show that
apical modulation can depolarize the pyramidal neuron membrane and can
enhance spikes, but this effect remains subliminal. The neurons carrying
unconscious content become modulated closer to up state, with subsequent
delayed effects on behavior. This indicates that AA needs to reach a certain
critical level in order to enable conscious perception of a stimulus.
18 The above described effects capitalize on the hypothetical facilitative
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preconditions for consciousness of particular perceptual contents
(see Chalmers 2000; Koch et al. 2016). As a consequence, experi-
mental strategies for studying states and contents became largely
independent.
This bifurcation of consciousness studies into two largely sep-
arate branches is problematic in light of the various systematic
links between global states and contents. To begin with, despite
continuous, moment-to-moment changes in experienced con-
tents in a global state, the state always has “some” experienced
content. Putting aside the “zero” states such as coma, dream-
less sleep, or general anesthesia, we cannot be in a global state
that has no subjectively experienced contents (see also Bach-
mann 2012; Bachmann and Hudetz 2014; Phillips et al. 2018;
Aru et al. 2019). The global states are most convincingly distin-
guished from each other by first-person experiences of sensations,
perceptions, feelings, or episodic memories (however dull, frag-
mented, or, to the opposite, vivid these contents are). In addition,
some contents can initiate a transition in the global state: a
pain may become so intense that the subject loses conscious-
ness altogether, or a sudden sound, processed initially subcon-
sciously, breaks through so as to wake up the recipient who
thus acquires a state of waking consciousness. Equally impor-
tant is the reverse dependence of experienced contents on global
states. The global state determines the overall nature of experi-
enced contents: there is a narrowly focused subjective content in
an emergency, somewhat restricted or blurred content in mildly
sedated subjects, and surreal content in hallucinogenic altered
states.
Given all these mutual dependencies, a comprehensive the-
ory of perceptual consciousness may be expected to elucidate the
neurobiological links between global states of consciousness and
experienced contents. Building on prior work of Bachmann and
Hudetz (2014), Aru et al. (2019), and Bachmann et al. (2020), we
will show that on the AA-centered theory, the distinction between
experienced contents and global states of consciousness is not
as hard and fast as is often assumed. Although global states are
maintained by partly different neurophysiological systems than
contents (mainly by subcortical structures in the brain stem and
midbrain in the case of waking consciousness—see Baars 1995),
there is close coordination in their mechanisms. Cellular mech-
anisms supporting apical function in L5 pyramidal cells act as
a bridge between global states of consciousness and conscious
perceptual contents.
At the cellular and molecular level, the link between global
states and perceptual contents is forged in the delicate inter-
play between the targeted AAs described above and the more
diffuse activity of various neuromodulators. The presence of an
appropriate global state per se does not explain the presence of
particular consciously experienced contents. Rather, the neuro-
modulators supporting the global states, in particular the global
state of active wakefulness, pave the way for the AA of particu-
lar local contents without being in itself sufficient for perceptual
consciousness. They enable and enhance the coupling between
apical and somatic integration zones (Phillips et al. 2018; Suzuki
and Larkum 2020).
There are significant variations in waking arousal in terms of
varying degrees of alertness or sleepiness. Levels of both choliner-
gic and aminergic activation fluctuate during quiet, active, and
stressed waking, with adrenergic fluctuations being on a faster
time-scale (Fig. 3). Apart from them, differences in the degree
of focus, emotional tone, and the relative dominance of external
percepts and internal thoughts all co-characterize the currently
dominant global state. Adrenergic, cholinergic, and other groups
Figure 3. The figure shows the various levels of cholinergic and
adrenergic activation that are associated with quiet, active, and stressed
wakeful states and with the states of slow-wave sleep and dreaming.
Activities within the apical dendritic tree and apical trunk are highly
sensitive to these neuromodulators, which change the way in which
these dendrites operate (as discussed in the text). Transitions between
the global states can occur either gradually or abruptly. As the figure
conveys only rank-order relations, the axes are in arbitrary units. The
main diagonal corresponds to the activation (A) dimension of the
Activation-Input-Modulation (AIM) model of the mental state (Hobson
2009). The diagonal orthogonal to that corresponds to Hobson’s
modulation (M) dimension, i.e. the composite ratio of aminergic and
cholinergic influences. Differences between quiet and active waking
states that arise from variations in cholinergic and aminergic arousal are
reported by Gervasoni et al. (2004). Transitions between states are based
on those observed by Gervasoni et al., including the infrequent
transitions directly from dreaming to quiet waking. Evidence
distinguishing active and highly stressed waking is reviewed by Arnsten
et al. (2012). Evidence that cholinergic arousal is at its highest during
dreaming is reviewed by Aru et al. (2020a)
of neuromodulators converge on apical function as the final com-
mon pathway by which they affect the global state of conscious-
ness. Apical dendrites are exceptionally sensitive to the neuro-
modulators that regulate phase changes in global states, such as
those from sleep to wakefulness, from sleep to dreaming, or from
quiet to active wakefulness (Carr et al. 2007; Barth et al. 2008;
Robbins and Arnsten 2009). Furthermore, the master regulator
of the neuromodulators, orexin (hypocretin) has a direct effect
on pyramidal cells; this effect plays a major role in maintaining
wakefulness (Sakurai 2007).
However, the effects of various neuromodulators are not lim-
ited to maintaining the global state and its level of arousal.
Cholinergic, adrenergic, serotonergic, histaminergic, and orex-
inergic neuromodulators associated with arousal all specifically
enhance apical function by increasing or decreasing the extent
to which the apical integration zone affects the somatic output
of pyramidal cells. Input to the apical integration zone has lit-
tle or no effect in REM and slow-wave sleep, which correlates
well with the low levels of adrenergic and cholinergic activation
in these global states (Fig. 3). In the awake mode, the func-
tion of the apical integration zone is usually amplifying, but
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ranging frommoderate in states of quiet wakefulness to excessive
when stress is too high. Arousal is thus a second-order contex-
tual effect: it modulates the local contextual modulation in apical
dendrites.
How is the effect of arousal on the global state of consciousness
implemented in the apical integration zone? Activating adrenore-
ceptors in awake mice increases calcium currents in the apical
tuft and lowers the threshold for the generation of amplifica-
tory calcium spikes by the apical integration zone (Labarrera et al.
2018). These effects are produced by reducing the “leaking” Ih
(hyperpolarization-activated) currents that flow through nonsy-
naptic HCN (hyperpolarization-activated cyclic nucleotide–gated)
channels in apical dendrites and reduce AA. Besides adrener-
gic neuromodulators, histamine and serotonin also inhibit the
AA-reducing Ih currents.
To repeat, this is not to say that the neuromodulatory influence
itself is sufficient for perceptual awareness. Rather, it paves the
way for the amplification of particular contents. Take cholinergic
influence on apical function as an example of this process. Cholin-
ergic activation is an enabling factor in apical function because it
has a role in linking apical input to the soma and in disinhibit-
ing apical input. In addition to this, cholinergic arousal increases
apical effects on the cell’s output by enhancing activation of the
VIP interneurons that inhibit the tonic activity of SOM inhibitory
interneurons in locally specific ways (Brombas et al. 2014; Karnani
et al. 2014). However, cholinergic activation itself is not sufficient
to specify what will be consciously perceived: this depends on
excitatory inputs to disinhibited apical branches. Without such
inputs, the implicit perceptual contents processed in somatic
parts of sensory neurons will not be amplified to the level suf-
ficient for conscious perception, no matter how significant the
cholinergic contributions will be.
Furthermore, as there are multiple neuromodulatory routes by
which apical function can be enhanced, some of those routes may
not even be necessary for normal perceptual awareness. When
one of them fails, e.g. as does the adrenergic system in cataplexy,
the others are still adequate to preserve perceptual experience.
This is true especially of the highly correlated activities of amin-
ergic (adrenergic, serotonergic, and histaminergic) systems. Each
of them is an enabling factor that contributes to arousal that is a
precondition of conscious experience, even though none of them
is by itself individually necessary.
Finally, the effects of neuromodulators are not limited to their
contribution of supporting and maintaining the global state of
consciousness. They can also directly influence various aspects of
conscious perception. For example, transient adrenergic bursts in
the awake state directly increase the focus of conscious processing
on selected stimuli in a way that enhances perceptual awareness
of these stimuli, as well as memory for them (Mather et al. 2016).
Similarly, drugs that increase adrenergic activation increase peo-
ple’s ability to detect and discriminate weak visual stimuli; drugs
that decrease adrenergic activation have the opposite effect on
perception (Gelbard-Sagiv et al. 2018; for a mechanism with a
similar effect in rodents, see Labarrera et al. 2018). Moreover, in
some global states, the nature of consciously perceived contents
is directly affected by neuromodulators. Serotonin has strong
effects on phenomenology and so do the various hallucinogens
associated with altered states of consciousness, such as psilocy-
bin, muscarin, and others (Corlett et al. 2019; Császár-Nagy et al.
2019; Dos Santos and Hallak 2020; Vollenweider and Preller 2020).
In sum, the distinction between global state mechanisms and
content mechanisms becomes somewhat blurry at the level of
intracellular processes.
Miscellaneous issues that arise
Relations of the AA theory to the dominant
network-level accounts of perceptual
consciousness
In looking for cellular foundations of perceptual experience, we
do not assume that perceptual experience occurs at the cellular
level (but see Edwards 2005; Sevush 2006). Neither do we claim, as
Bickle (2006) does, that the network-level processes studied by the
cognitive neuroscience of consciousness are amerely heuristically
useful stage of inquiry, ultimately leading theorists to explana-
tions of perceptual consciousness at the cellular and molecular
levels. Rather, our claim is that events at the network level need
to be complemented by explanations of cellular processes such as
those described in this article, if we are to understand and explain
perceptual experience. Our hypothesis is that AA provides cellu-
lar mechanisms that are necessary for the network dynamics of
which our full-blown human perceptual experience consists.
In line with this proposal, AA may be conceived as the first,
cellular stage of the entire coordinated set of CSAMs that turn
unconscious contents into conscious ones and span multiple lev-
els of functional organization. The AA-based theory is thus not a
direct competitor of network-level theories of consciousness such
as the recurrent processing theory (RPT; Lamme 2010), the global
neuronal workspace theory (Dehaene 2014; Mashour et al. 2020),
or the integrated information theory (IIT; Tononi and Koch 2015).
Rather, together with (Aru et al. 2020b), we propose that it pro-
vides cellular mechanisms for basic capabilities implied by these
theories.
On RPT, sensory areas need recurrent inputs from higher areas
in order for conscious perception to take place. Apical dendrites
are implicated in this recurrence on anatomical grounds because
they are the dendrites most affected by recurrent signals. Recur-
rent signals affect apical dendrites both directly via excitatory
synapses and indirectly via the activation of the interneurons that
inhibit or disinhibit them. Apical dendrites are also implicated in
recurrence on the grounds that recurrence is in danger of gen-
erating runaway overexcitation if activity of cells in each part of
the loop is sufficient to generate activity in the next. This danger
can be overcome if at least at one stage of the loop the recur-
rent connections cannot drive activity by themselves but operate
as amplifiers of response to input from outside the loop. Impor-
tantly, on the present account, it is not recurrence per se that
contributes to make the perceptual contents conscious. Rather,
recurrence contributes to conscious perception by triggering intra-
cellular amplifications that greatly strengthen the effects of the
cell’s output at the sites to which it projects.19
Global neuronal workspace theory proposes a different
network-level consciousness-awarding mechanism than RPT.
It suggests that unconsciously encoded signals from sensory-
perceptual nodes must be widely broadcast to other parts of the
cortex. This idea receives some support from neuroimaging evi-
dence that a sensory input activates more cortical regions when
it is experienced than when it is not. AA may contribute to the
broadcasting onwhich this theory relies. The output of some pyra-
midal cells may be “broadcast” in the sense that it is used as part
of the contextual input to cells in different cortical regions. This
sort of broadcasting may have a wide range of different breadths.
Some pyramidal cells could provide modulatory apical input to a
19 Incidentally, this feature of the apical hypothesis shields it from the
“unfolding argument” recently made against causal theories of consciousness
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few other cells. Some could provide inputs tomanymore. No pyra-
midal cell could directly provide apical input to all columns in the
same or other regions, but some cells may be able to contribute
to the apical input of many other cells indirectly via a chain of
intermediary loops. We propose that AAmakes this kind of broad-
casting feasible because it allows cells to receive broadcast signals
while retaining their own locally specific contribution to the trans-
mission of sensory information. The broadcast tells themwhether
the highly specific sensory information that they are designed to
detect is or is not relevant to the ongoing activity of the system
as a whole. This information about relevance is communicated to
them via their apical dendrites in layer 1.20
There is also overlap between context-sensitive selective AA
and IIT. The AA hypothesis was formulated because it provides
cellular foundations for a long-lasting theory of the contextual
guidance of processing and learning in the neocortex, i.e. the the-
ory of Coherent Infomax. Although themathematical formulation
of AA as a part of the theory of Coherent Infomax is not empha-
sized in this article, the objectives, learning rules (Kay and Phillips
2011), and short-term activation dynamics (Kay and Phillips 2020)
of that theory have all been formulated explicitly in information
theoretic terms. The theory of Coherent Infomax was related in
detail to cortical computation long ago (Phillips and Singer 1997),
although not at the cellular level until recently (Phillips et al. 2016;
Phillips 2017). The distinction between receptive fields and contex-
tual fields, on which the theory of Coherent Infomax is based, is
equivalent to that between the basal input, which specifies recep-
tive field sensitivity, and apical input, which conveys contextual
field information.
Thus, AA provides a cellular mechanism for the short-term
dynamics of contextual modulation required by Coherent Info-
max. That theory and IIT are both explicitly formulated in infor-
mation theoretic terms and “information” has the same meaning
in both theories. The difference is that although “Coherence” is
in some ways analogous to the holistic property referred to as
“Integration” in IIT, the Coherent Infomax does not conceptual-
ize the processing in visual and other sensory areas in terms of
integration: the contextual field information processed via api-
cal dendrites does not integrate with the feedforward somatic
information. In addition, IIT mostly confines the processes imple-
menting visual perceptual experience to the “posterior HOT-zone”
comprising temporal, parietal, and occipital areas (Koch et al.
2016). Although the AA theory also emphasizes the role of pos-
terior areas in conscious perception, it insists that they must
be supported by contextual apical inputs that partly originate
beyond the posterior region. Without such inputs, perceptual con-
tents will not be amplified and, consequently, will not become
conscious.21
Different kinds or degrees of AA?
A hypothesis worthy of further exploration is that different kinds
or degrees of selective AA are at the root of different modes of
20 According to global neuronal workspace theory, a subset of workspace
neurons coding for the current conscious content is activated in the process
of “ignition” launched in the prefrontal cortex, with the remainder of the
workspace neurons being temporally inhibited (Mashour et al. 2020). Although
variants of the theory mostly remain agnostic about the cellular processes
associated with ignition, Moutard et al. (2015, 197) note that L5 pyramidal neu-
rons with their apical integration zones provide one possible neurobiological
mechanism for ignition launching.
21 IIT has been strongly criticized for implying panpsychism (Merker et al.
2021). In contrast to IIT, AA as a cellular mechanism for human conscious
experience associates experience with a special kind of context-sensitive infor-
mation processing in the neocortex (Phillips 2012), where context includes
information both from within the neocortex and from multiple other sources.
conscious perception. For example, it is possible that informa-
tion that is amplified to a small extent above the low level of
spontaneous cellular activity helps to establish the broad field of
conscious experience, whereas the focus of conscious experience
is related to the activity of a small subset of cells, the output of
which is amplified far more by attention.
A perspective on these two stages of perceptual awareness
that resonates with the capabilities of context-sensitive pyra-
midal cells is proposed by Lamme (2004b, 2020). He interprets
much of the evidence from studies of vision as indicating that
there are major transitions from being fully invisible to being vis-
ible, and, from being unattended to being attended when visible.
Context-sensitivity of two-point neurons could provide a cellular
foundation for selection at both stages. Preattentive amplification
is likely to depend onmany contextual interactions that are highly
local in space and time, operate in parallel across the visual field
as a whole, and remain largely, if not wholly, confined to partic-
ular sensory areas. Attentive amplification in the second stage
is more likely to depend on a wider context that includes cur-
rent goals and emotional reactions as well as stimulus salience.
It therefore depends more on nonlocal apical inputs coming from
distant sources and takes longer.
As we stressed (in the “Context-sensitivity and selectivity of
AA” section) the role of higher-order thalamic nuclei in context-
sensitive perception, it is important to add that higher-order thala-
mus also participates in the control of the AA-mediated attention.
As Schmitt et al. (2017) have recently shown, recurrent loops con-
necting the higher-order thalamus with regions of the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) sustain attention by their amplifying effects on cor-
tical connectivity, and are particularly complex, even in mice.
Apical dendrites have a central role in these recurrent loops, with
connections from the dorsal thalamic nucleus going to apical
synapses near the apical spike initiation zone of cells in PFC, and
connections from the ventral thalamic nucleus going to the more
distant tips of the apical tuft (Collins et al. 2018). The functional
consequences of these complexities are yet to be unraveled, but it
is already clear that these recurrent corticothalamic connections
avoid creating strong loops because higher-order thalamus has
modulatory, rather than driving, effects on the PFC (Collins et al.
2018). This is in line with the finding that too much of attentional
amplification may actually “extinguish” conscious awareness (see
Bachmann and Murd 2010; Bachmann 2011; Murd and Bachmann
2011). Therefore, a simple picture in which more amplification
always implies more sharply focused attentive awareness must
be resisted.
AA and backpropagation algorithms
Given the extraordinary success of machine learning based upon
the backpropagation algorithm, the possibility that something
similar to it happens in the neocortex is nowunder intense investi-
gation. One of the models employed in this project is based on the
distinction between apical and basal inputs (e.g. Sacramento et al.
2018). We agree that research on this issue is of great importance,
but think that it still has far to go before it reaches themultitasking
context-sensitive flexibility of the mammalian neocortex. First,
backpropagation algorithms use the backpropagated signals to
guide learning, not ongoing processing. In contrast to that, there is
ample evidence that the neocortex uses context not only for learn-
ing but also, and primarily, to amplify the transmission of selected
signals, such as those signaling the presence of a figure against the
ground or providing information relevant to the current task (see,
for instance, Lamme 2004a; Gilbert and Sigman 2007; Phillips et al.
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learning and pyramidal cells with two points of integration face
the problem of distinguishing the effects of the backpropagated
input from that of all the other inputs to the apical dendrites
of pyramidal cells. Third, input to the apical dendrite has been
directly shown to guide learning as well as processing, but noth-
ing in this evidence in any obvious way suggests that this process
is analogous to the backpropagation machine-learning algorithm
(Doron et al. 2020). Fourth, although attempts to develop useful
algorithms in which contextual input to apical dendrites guides
both processing and learning are in their infancy, there have
already been some success. One of these, argued to be relevant to
consciousness studies, uses the formal distinction between recep-
tive and contextual fields to illuminate multisensory audiovisual
speech processing (Adeel 2020). An earlier theory of learning with
two sites of synaptic integration has highlighted the transfer only
of the relevant information fromhigher to lower regions, with rele-
vance being signaled by the apical input (Körding and König 2000).
This theory shows how location invariant object recognition can
be achieved by this intracellular mechanism. Finally, Haga and
Fukai (2018) develop a model in which apical input guides fast
robust learning of sequences of neuronal activity. In this model,
apical input affects current processing via a multiplicative gain
modulation. None of these recent models use the backpropaga-
tion learning algorithm. The consequences of such new lines of
research on the contextual guidance of both learning and process-
ing for our understanding of the neocortex, and for AI technology,
are potentially groundbreaking.
Concluding remarks
The perspective outlined in this article is essentially in agree-
ment with the dendritic integration theory of Aru et al. (2020b)
and Bachmann et al. (2020), but there are differences. First, there
is a simple matter of terminology. The phrase “apical amplifica-
tion” makes clear that the perspective advocated here concerns
apical dendrites in particular, not dendritic computation in gen-
eral. Second, and more importantly, “amplification” contrasts
with “integration” in that the key point of the notion of ampli-
fication is that information about the amplifier is kept separate
from the information transmitted by the signal that is amplified.
Thus, the notion of amplification is explicitly distinguished from
what is meant by “integration” in mathematics, and as intended
in the much used description of the “integrate-and-fire” mode in
which point neurons operate.22 Third, as noted in the “Apical
amplification distinguishes modulation from the specification of
informational content” section, our view of AA does not imply
any form of pattern matching between apical and somatic con-
tents. Fourth, the perspective advocated here explicitly argues
that context-sensitive selection between alternatives is a cardinal
function of conscious experience. Fifth, the perspective advocated
here emphasizes a range of subcortical inputs to apical dendrites
that extends well beyond inputs from the higher-order thala-
mus and includes input from neuromodulators of the arousal
systems (which are crucial to the role of apical dendrites in con-
scious experience, as we discussed in some detail in the “AA as
a bridge between global states of consciousness and conscious
perceptual contents” section). In particular, we put emphasis on
adrenergic arousal, which dendritic integration theory does not
mention at all. Finally, our notion of AA is distinctive in being built
on the long-standing mathematical formulation of the different
22 For details of this formal mathematical conception of amplification as a
form of modulation, see Kay et al. (2017) and Kay and Phillips (2020).
functions of receptive and contextual fields that were developed
as part of the theory of Coherent Infomax (e.g. Phillips and Singer
1997) before the discoveries suggesting that apical dendrites may
be able to function as contextual field information receptors.
As the list of these differences between AA and dendritic inte-
gration theory show, the two theories are complementary, not
conflicting. Our conception of AA as a cellular mechanism for
selective conscious perception also resonates with several other
prior proposals (e.g. Cauller and Kulics 1988, 1991; Cauller and
Connors 1992; LaBerge et al. 2000; Spratling and Johnson 2004;
LaBerge and Kasevich 2013). These different proposals have dif-
ferent emphases, however. For example, whereas LaBerge and
colleagues put emphasis on EEG rhythms and synchronized oscil-
lations (LaBerge and Kasevich 2017), we put emphasis on neu-
romodulatory arousal. These different emphases are mutually
supportive, however, not antagonistic, because the different pro-
posals share the common conception of apical dendrites in layer
1 as a channel for the amplification of selected signals.
As context-sensitive selective amplification is such a basic
cognitive requirement and context-sensitive neurons with two
points of integration are so ubiquitous throughout the cortex,
the perspective advocated here raises indefinitely many issues
whose resolution will require the efforts of many laboratories for
decades to come. Only a few of these issues have been iden-
tified in this article. Still, there are several ways in which this
article advances beyond prior publications arguing that apical
dendrites are a major route by which context guides processing
and learning. First, the possibility that this apical route provides
cellular mechanisms relevant to conscious perceptual experience
is examined rigorously in this article from a theoretical viewpoint
and is explicitly related to currently prominent theories of the
neuronal bases of consciousness. Second, earlier articles argued
for close relations between AA and conscious experience on the
grounds that both depend on adrenergic arousal (Phillips et al.
2016, 2018). This claim is modified here by increasing emphasis
on the role of other neuromodulators also and cholinergic arousal
in particular (see Fig. 3). Third, for the first time, cross-modal
interactions between unimodal cortical regions are shown to pro-
vide clear demonstrations of both contextual modulation and its
dependence on apical dendrites in layer 1 of the neocortex (Fig. 2).
Fourth, AA is here related to experiments exploring the extent of
nonconscious perceptual processing, such as the studies of visual
masking.
Research on dendritic computation is in its infancy and still
has far to go. Many will assume that an adequate computa-
tional explication of how conscious experience at the network
level arises from intracellular processes is a far distant mile-
stone in that journey. Nevertheless, it may well be reached
within this decade or the next. It is already clear that func-
tional distinctions between apical and basal dendrites have a
major role in dendritic computation and that this principle has
a central role in capabilities restricted to the wakeful state, such
as perceptual disambiguation, attention, working memory, and
learning (Poirazi and Papoutsi 2020). There is also clear evidence
for distinctively human forms of apical function because the
apical integration zone is more effectively separated from the
soma in human pyramidal cells (Beaulieu-Laroche et al. 2018;
Gidon et al. 2020), and a newly discovered inhibitory interneu-
ron not observed in rodents is part of the inhibitory/disinhibitory
microcircuitry that specifically regulates the activation of api-
cal dendrites (Boldog et al. 2018). Further properties of human
pyramidal cells that enable them to perform computations pre-
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Poirazi and Papoutsi (2020). Consequences of reaching the mile-
stone of rigorously establishing the cellular foundations of human
conscious experience in explicit information processing terms are
unforeseeable. They would surely be transformative for medicine
by enabling strategies for managing malfunctions, whether phys-
iological or psychological, to be engineered, rather than being
developed by trial and error. The consequences of releasing
the capabilities of conscious information processing from bio-
logical constraints by embodying them in silicon are at present
unimaginable.
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Appendix
Converging lines of evidence for
unconscious and preconscious perceptual
processing
Evidence for unconscious and preconscious perceptual process-
ing has been gathered with a variety of experimental paradigms.
These paradigms seek the fulfillment of the following two condi-
tions: (1) a stimulus S with perceptual/cognitive/affective content
that can be explicitly experienced in conscious perception when
S is presented alone becomes explicitly not experienced when S
is presented in a special stimulation context (designed to prevent
explicit conscious experience of S), and (2) there are experimen-
tal dependent measures (including speeded discrimination, cat-
egorization, spontaneous response selection, or specific neural
processing markers) such that it is possible to demonstrate the
dependence of their value on the content of S.
One group of studies allowing to achieve the above-mentioned
twofold aim can be brought under the general category of “mask-
ing.” A brief stimulus (typically lasting less than 50ms) is accom-
panied in space and time with a different stimulus, which
masks conscious experience of its companion. One of the stim-
uli remains perceptually subliminal. For effective masking to
be achieved, typically there is close spatial and temporal dis-
tance between both stimuli (from spatial overlap to adjacency
and from temporal overlap to very short stimuli onset asyn-
chrony, e.g. between 0 and 150ms). For example, there are
well-documentedmasked priming effects by subliminal semantic,
response-choice, affective, or visual-category primes on subse-
quent identification, categorization, and autonomic unconscious
threat detection responses (Van Gaal et al. 2010; Finkbeiner and
Friedman 2011; Van Der Ploeg et al. 2017; Avneon and Lamy 2018;
Kiefer et al. 2019). Even if, in principle, masking may have only
a partial effect whereby not all stimulus content is deprived of
explicit perception and the stimulus has not become fully sub-
liminal (e.g. something flashed, but its perceptual category could
not be explicitly discriminated above chance), that part of con-
tents that was not consciously perceived nevertheless remains
subliminal.
The neural signatures of subliminal contents may remain suf-
ficiently robust to be decoded by third-person methods. Stein
et al. (2021) used fMRI measurements to correctly categorize sub-
jectively invisible masked stimuli (faces or houses). Subjectively
invisible stimuli activated sensory-perceptual areas specialized
in content processing (Stein et al. 2021, Fig. 3a and b). Interest-
ingly, when the differences between scans in subjectively invisi-
ble and objectively invisible conditions were analyzed, narrowly
focused brain areas of relatively higher activity for subjectively
invisible conditions were still found. In a complementary fashion,
Fahrenfort et al. (2017) conclude that representations of stimuli
that do not enter awareness nevertheless “have a neural signature
that is indistinguishable from perceptually rich representations
that occur for objects that do enter into conscious awareness”
(Fahrenfort et al. 2017, 3744). Such results are especially impor-
tant for our argument in the “A cellular conscious-status awarding
mechanism operates upon unconsciously computed perceptual
contents” section of the main text, viz., that the function of
consciousness-awarding mechanisms is not to create representa-
tions of features or objects de novo but to amplify them to the level
sufficient for conscious perception.
Animal studies capitalizing on masking have also been infor-
mative. Paired presentation of stimuli that remained out of
awareness produced “Hebbian learning” in V1 neurons and facil-
itated the subsequent processing of these stimuli (Pojoga et al.
2020). These authors demonstrated that effectively masked natu-
ral images were encoded by V1 cell populations in monkeys to the
extent sufficient for later content-dependent behavioral effects.
When the same images were subsequently presented above the
perceptual threshold, perceptual performance and neuronal sen-
sitivity were improved relative to the control condition. Pojoga and
coauthors concluded that “exposure to subthreshold, behaviorally
irrelevant, stimuli in the absence of awareness improves stimu-
lus discriminability and perceptual performance while increasing
the amount of sensory information extracted by V1 population
activity, and the sensitivity and precision of individual cells. Thus,
subthreshold stimuli activate neuronal networks involved in per-
ception, and this activation contributes to subsequent changes in






/nc/article/2021/2/niab036/6395042 by Filozoficky U
stav AV C
R
 user on 14 O
ctober 2021
Apical amplification 17
Methodologically close to masking are the continuous flash
suppression (Tsuchiya and Koch 2005), breaking continuous flash
suppression (bCFS) (Jiang et al. 2007), and breaking repeated
masked suppression (Abir and Hassin 2020) paradigms designed
to study the content-dependent effects of subliminal stimuli. The
continuous flash suppression and breaking continuous flash sup-
pression methods are a combination of binocular rivalry (see
further on) and dichoptic masking where the suppressor (in the
role of mask) and contentful stimulus are presented to the dif-
ferent eyes, while in breaking repeated masked suppression,
stimulus and mask are presented to the same eye(s), but they
are repeatedly presented for longer periods. Compared to mask-
ing, these extended suppression methods allow much more pro-
longed presentation of the stimulus (or at least its imperative
content exerting subliminally driven effects) in the subliminal
mode. If a stimulus breaks through its suppression earlier than
some other stimulus, and if this depends on the content of
the stimulus, this constitutes a strong case for subliminal con-
tent processing. For instance, using breaking repeated masked
suppression to explore what will be prioritized for subsequent
emergence in consciousness, Abir and Hassin (2020) replicated
the standard findings from breaking continuous flash suppres-
sion where upright faces and dominant faces break through
to consciousness earlier than inverted faces and nondominant
faces.
Another experimental paradigm employs “bodily movements”
without or in addition to verbal report or categorical response
selection as a dependent measure. In this paradigm, content-
dependent, subsequent response predictive eye movements for
stimuli that failed to reach awareness have been identified
(Kietzmann et al. 2011; Spering and Carrasco 2015). Content-
dependent hand movements in reaching tasks, observed and
measured during preconscious stages of stimulus processing,
also provide empirical evidence in support of the unconscious
content processing conjecture (e.g. Song and Nakayama 2009;
Finkbeiner and Friedman 2011; Freeman et al. 2011). However,
such movement-based methods are less direct compared to, e.g.
awareness clarity rating methods. It may therefore be difficult
to use them to disentangle cases in which unreported phenom-
enal experience remains present from the complete absence of
phenomenal experience.
Significant effects of masked content-based search cues on
correct responses and respective “ERP signatures” have been doc-
umented (Travis et al. 2019). Similarly, an effect of self-relevant
names (pattern masked to become subliminal) on ERP mark-
ers known to be indicative of self-relevance has been found
(Doradzińska et al. 2020).
The list of methods and approaches validating the claim that
contents can be processed and represented unconsciously could
be extended further. For example, there is also the effect of
implicit processing of unexpected stimuli left out of awareness
due to “inattentional blindness” (reviewed in Nobre et al. 2020).
Combining no-report paradigmwith “binocular rivalry,” Hesse and
Tsao (2020) showed that the same set of inferotemporal neurons is
involved in both conscious and unconscious coding of visual stim-
uli. These are but a few examples; interested readers may learn
about further details in reviews of, for instance, Kim and Blake
(2005), Kouider and Dehaene (2007), Rohaut and Naccache (2017),
or Soto et al. (2019).
Evidence suggests that unconscious content-related processes
are characterized by a hierarchical nature and that whether there
is conscious perception or not need not be necessarily evident
according to the all-or-none rule (Breitmeyer 2015; Breitmeyer and
Hesselmann 2019). Some experimental methods can control ear-
lier level brain mechanisms necessary for some types/aspects of
conscious experience, and some other methods can tap specifi-
cally into the mid-level or high-level nodes in the content repre-
senting hierarchy. Moreover, contents of experience span along
modal sensory features, wholistic perceptual objects, modally
categorical classes, amodal imaginary contents, and abstract
semantic representations. Thus, the methodological and theoret-
ical issues of research on unconscious processing of contents are
by no means solved and pertinent research continues (see, e.g.
Hurme et al. 2017; Peel et al. 2018; Greenwald and Lai 2020; Stein
et al. 2021). Despite the lack of consensus about all the subtleties
of the unconscious processing, the mass of research data shows
that while unconscious processing is similar to conscious process-
ing in many respects (e.g. associates with the same specialized
cortical areas), there are also conspicuous differences. The differ-
ences most relevant to our argument in the main text concern
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